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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 19-3320 
_______________ 
 
MOMAR TALLA NDIR, 
                      Petitioner 
 
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a 
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A200-576-765) 
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 15, 2020 
_______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, PORTER, and FISHER, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 16, 2020) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Momar Talla Ndir petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) adopting and affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision ordering 
Ndir removed. We will deny in part and dismiss in part Ndir’s petition for review. 
I 
Ndir is a native and citizen of Senegal who arrived in the United States on a non-
immigrant visa in 2003 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2013. Then, in 2017, 
Ndir pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), (a)(1), and one count of aggravated identity theft and 
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, (a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
According to Ndir’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), Ndir’s crimes resulted in 
$481,000 in total identifiable losses, and the money laundering scheme resulted in 
$294,877.41 in fraudulent purchases associated with Ndir’s membership account at 
Sam’s Club. Ndir was sentenced to forty-two months’ imprisonment. 
In 2018, Ndir was charged as removable because he was an aggravated felon 
based on his money-laundering conviction. A conviction for money laundering under 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 is an aggravated felony “if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000[.]” 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D). 
During the removal proceedings, the Department of Homeland Security sought to 
enter Ndir’s conviction record and PSR into evidence. Ndir objected to the admission of 
the PSR and contested the reliability of its loss calculation. The IJ admitted the evidence. 
The IJ then found Ndir removable. 
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The IJ granted a continuance, however, because Ndir was planning to marry a 
United States citizen and then to file for adjustment of status. At a later hearing, Ndir 
sought another continuance. The IJ denied Ndir’s request because Ndir’s fiancée was still 
married, her divorce was not finalized, and Ndir had not completed an application for 
protection from removal. Because Ndir’s previous conviction was a qualifying 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D), the IJ ordered Ndir removed to 
Senegal. 
Ndir appealed to the BIA, which adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision finding 
Ndir removable and denying his request for a continuance. AR 3–4. Ndir timely 
petitioned for review. 
II1 
 Ndir raises three arguments in his petition for review.2 All are meritless. First, 
Ndir contends that the IJ could not consider the PSR when calculating the loss associated 
with his offense.3 When deciding whether the government proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that the loss resulting from a crime exceeds $10,000, we use the 
“circumstance-specific approach.” Singh v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 503, 512 (3d Cir. 
 
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We also have jurisdiction to consider our own 
jurisdiction. See Borrome v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). Venue 
is proper because the IJ conducted Ndir’s immigration hearing in York, Pennsylvania. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). 
2 When the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision, “we review the decisions of both the IJ and the 
BIA.” Shehu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  
3 We review de novo Ndir’s first challenge. See Singh v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 503, 
508 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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2012). That approach allows us to consider “sentencing-related material[.]” Id. (citation 
omitted). Thus, a PSR may be considered “so long as the petitioner has been given ‘a fair 
opportunity’ to challenge the Government’s claim.” Fan Wang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 898 
F.3d 341, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)). 
Ndir does not argue that he did not have a fair opportunity to challenge the government’s 
loss calculation in his PSR. So the IJ could properly consider it.4 
 Second, Ndir argues that the PSR’s loss calculation was unreliable.5 In particular, 
Ndir contends that substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s conclusion that the 
government proved by clear and convincing evidence that the loss from his crime 
exceeded $10,000. He argues that the $481,000 loss amount does not represent the actual 
loss and that the “loss amount is not separated out between the two counts of the 
conviction.” Pet’r’s Br. 18. But the PSR notes that the fraudulent purchases associated 
with Ndir’s Sam’s Club account totaled nearly $300,000. Ndir’s money-laundering 
conviction is based on the fraudulent purchases from that account. See Administrative R. 
 
4 Ndir argues that precedent used the circumstance-specific approach to analyze fraud 
under only 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and not money laundering under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(D). Given the similar definitions in (M)(i) and (D), we see no reason to use 
a different standard for calculating loss amounts depending on the underlying offense of 
conviction. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (covering an offense that “involves 
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000”), with 
§ 1101(a)(43)(D) (covering “an offense described in [18 U.S.C. § 1956] (relating to 
laundering of monetary instruments) . . . if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000”). 
5 Whether the government proved by clear and convincing evidence that the loss 
exceeded $10,000 is a question of fact. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33–34 
(2009). We review questions of fact for substantial evidence. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 
F.3d 228, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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130. Thus, substantial evidence supported the IJ’s conclusion that clear and convincing 
evidence showed that Ndir’s crime resulted in a loss exceeding $10,000. 
 Third, Ndir argues that the IJ abused its discretion by not granting his request for a 
continuance.6 Because Ndir is removable as an aggravated felon, we can review only 
constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D). Ndir’s challenge 
to the denial of a continuance does not raise a constitutional claim or question of law. 
Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this claim. See Rachak v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 734 F.3d 
214, 217 (3d Cir. 2013). 
* * * 
 For these reasons, we will deny in part and dismiss in part Ndir’s petition for 
review. 
 
6 We review for abuse of discretion Ndir’s challenge to the IJ’s denial of a continuance. 
See Khan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 448 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2006). 
